Initial variables of the data collection process:
UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
No record.
Perception of peacekeeping
No record.
Domestic political environment
Equatorial Guinea has nominally had a multiparty system since 1991 (EIU 2006o, 4). However, “the president, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, who seized power in a coup in 1979, dominates the government and public administration almost as completely as in the earlier period of one-party and military rule” (Ibid.).
Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, has continued to consolidate his position following his re-election as chairman of the ruling Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial (PDGE) in July and his government reshuffle in August. He will remain unchallenged at least until his current mandate ends in 2009. Until the succession issue is resolved, the main threat to political stability would be if Obiang were to die or become incapacitated, which could prompt a major power struggle. Unsurprisingly, therefore, government institutions, parliament and civil society remain weak, reflecting the fact that the political system has failed to change anywhere near as quickly as the booming oil economy. (EIU 2006bl, 1)
The discovery of large deposits of oil and gas in the 1990s transformed Equatorial Guinea into one of Africa’s fastest-growing economies in 2005 the rate of expansion was second only to that of Angola and one of the main destinations of US investment in the continent (EIU 2006o, 17). But “few people have benefited from the oil riches and the country ranks near the bottom of a UN human development index” (BBC 2006q, par. 2). The government has started a scheme to divert a share of oil revenues into social projects (Ibid). This is aiming to benefit a larger numer of its citizens. Nevertheless, “the corruption watchdog Transparency International has put Equatorial Guinea in the top 10 of its list of corrupt states” (Ibid.). Despite calls for more transparency in the sector, President Obiang has said oil revenues are a state secret (Ibid.).
Military affairs
The military occupies a delicate position in Equatorial Guinea (EIU 2006o, 11). It was used by Obiang to seize power in 1979 and has persistently been linked with plots ever since (Ibid.). As a result “the president has placed command of the military in the hands of close relatives and kept numbers small and equipment levels modest” (Ibid.). Thus, if Equatorial Guinea decides to be considered as a troop contribution, it will find opposition due it the human rights credibility of its forces.
Army funding and training increased considerably following attacks on government facilities by separatists of the Bubi minority in 1998 (Ibid.).
Concerns over maritime security and the threat posed by neighboring powers have also encouraged the government to increase army numbers and improve weaponry. In addition, the government engages the services of private US security companies as part of its defence policy. The army nevertheless remains a potential source of challenge to the president, and senior officers, including close relatives of his, are said to have been associated with an alleged conspiracy against the government uncovered in December 2003. This may slow efforts to develop the army as an effective fighting force. (Ibid.)
When Obiang seized power in 1979 he abandoned his predecessor’s partly pro-Soviet, partly isolationist foreign policy (Ibid., 10). He restored relations with Western powers in general and the former colonial power, Spain, in particular (Ibid.). He also courted France (Ibid.). And China is playing an important role, perhaps the most important.
The arrival of oil in the mid-1990s transformed relations with foreign powers. Donors no longer seek democratic change; instead, the same countries are anxiously pursuing commercial opportunities in Africa’s fastest-growing economy and are tailoring their diplomacy accordingly. Spain, for example, tried to exploit deteriorating relations in 2003 between Equatorial Guinea and its neighbor Gabon, which is closely allied to France, to improve its relations with Malabo to the detriment of Paris. The US, has also sought to improve its relations with Equatorial Guinea. Most of the estimated US$6bn of foreign direct investment that has flowed into Equatorial Guinea since the mid-1990s has been from US companies. In October 2003 the US reopened its embassy in Malabo, and US officials tried to downplay the human rights issues that had contributed to the decision to close the mission in 1995. (Ibid.)
Regional relations are tense (Ibid.). And this affects the possibility of collaboration with neighboring countries.
Equatorial Guinea’s emergence as an oil power has attracted the attention of countries and companies in the US, Europe and further a field. Within the region, however, the impact of the oil boom has proved more problematic for a country that has always been wary of its larger and until recently wealthier neighbors. Efforts to demarcate the maritime boundary with Nigeria, for example, were complicated by the discovery of an oilfield that straddled the disputed area. Equatorial Guinea’s relations with Gabon deteriorated sharply in 2003 in a dispute concerning sovereignty over Mbagne Island in the Corisco Bay, through which their maritime boundary runs. (Ibid.)
In the current environment, Equatorial Guinea is set to exploit the emerging rivalry between the US and China. At present, US companies dominate the country’s energy sector, and although Washington recently decided to upgrade its embassy in the capital, Malabo, US legislators and civil society have demanded that the US administration put pressure on Equatorial Guinea to improve its record on human rights and corruption. But the USA has a strong competitor. The Chinese government with its policy of noninterference in domestic affairs shares no such concerns, and in late 2005 Obiang described China as Equatorial Guinea’s natural partner in development. (Ibid.)
Climate changes
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.
Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.
Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.
